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Institute of Systems Science 
National University of Singapore 
{baofeng, deng, yfhan, jeng, desai, teowhin}@iss.nus.sg 
Abstract .  In this paper we present a method of attacking public-key 
cryptosystems (PKCs) on tamper esistant devices. The attack makes 
use of transient faults and seems applicable to many types of PKCs. 
In particular, we show how to attack the RSA, the E1Gamal signature 
scheme, the Schnorr signature scheme, and the DSA. We also present 
some possible methods to counter the attack. 
1 In t roduct ion  
In September 1996, Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton from Bellcore announced a new 
type of cryptanalytic attack against RSA-like public key cryptosystems on tam- 
per resistant devices such as smart card [4]. However, technical details of the 
Bellcore attack were withheld in that announcement and was released only at the 
end of October 1996. On 18th October 1996, Biham and Shamir published their 
attack, called Differential Fault Analysis (DFA), to secret key eryptosystems [5], 
such as DES. Some concrete ideas on how their attack works were revealed in 
their announcement. 
Our work here was motivated first by the Bellcore announcement and then 
by the DFA announcement. Our first report on attacking RSA and some coun- 
termeasures were posted in the Internet on the 23rd and 24th October 1996 [2]. 
Right after that, A. K. Lenstra sent us his memo [9] on attacking RSA in Chi- 
nese remainder in a private communication. Subsequently, we released a more 
complete research note on attacking RSA and the E1Gamal signature scheme on 
the 29th October 1996 [3]. Recently, Joye and Quisquater extended the Chinese 
remaindering attack to LUC and Demytko cryptosystems [8]. 
In this paper, we continue our earlier effort of attacking public-key cryptosys- 
terns (PKCs) on tamper esistant devices. Our attacking model makes use of the 
transient faults and seems applicable to many types of PKCs, such a.s RSA-like 
schemes and discrete logarithm based schemes. As in the Bellcore and DFA an- 
nouncements, we assume that by exposing a sealed tamper esistant device such 
as a smart card to certain physical effects (e.g., ionizing or microwave radiation), 
one can induce with reasonable probability faults at random bit locations in a 
tamper esistant device at some random intermediate stage in the cryptographic 
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computation. The faults in the random bit locations do not influence the code 
itself, i.e., the program itself does not crash, and only some of the values it op- 
erates upon are affected. It is further assumed that the attacker is in physical 
possession of the tamper esistant, device and that he can repeat the experiment 
with the same private key by applying external physicM effects to obtain t3.ulty 
outputs. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we first report our 
attacks to RSA, and then present Lenstra's attack to RSA implemented based on 
the Chinese Remainder Algorithm (CRA). In Section 3, we show how to break 
discrete logarithm based schemes uch as the E1GamM signature scheme [7], the 
Schnorr signature scheme [11], and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). At 
the end of each section, we also give some possible methods to counter the attack. 
When this manuscript was near its completion, Dan Boneh kindly sent us 
their paper [6] in a. private communication. Throughout his paper, we will 
make remarks about the relation between their paper and our work wherever it 
is appropriate. 
2 Attacking the RSA Scheme 
Let. n = pq be the product of two primes p and q in RSA, e be the public 
exponent which is publicly known and d be the private exponent which is stored 
inside the tamper resistant device. Our attacks to RSA will be described in 
terms of ciphertext decryption although they can also be described in terms of 
signature generation. 
Let m be a plaintext, then the corresponding ciphertext is 
c ~ m e mod n 
Denote the binary representation of the private exponent as dr_ t ld t_2t . . ,  ldil 
• --Idl Id0, where di, taking value 1 or O, is the ith bit, t is the number of bits in 
d, and x ly  denotes concatenation of x and y. Further, we denote 
ci =--. c'-" mod n, for i = O, 1,2 ..... t -  1 
Given c and d, the corresponding ptaintext m can be expressed as 
2.1 At tack  I 
For the sake of simplicity, here we assume that in decrypting a ciphertext a 
single bit error is induced in ci, for a random i E {0, 1,2 . . . . .  t - 1}. Denote the 
corrupted value as c~. Then the output from the tamper resistant device is 
dr-1 Id, dl _do mod 77 171 _ c t -1  . . . c  i . . . c  t Co 
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The attacker now has both fil and ill' so that he is able to compute 
f i l l  Id, 
- -  ci rood n 
ft'/, - -  C d i  
! 
which equals ~ mod n if di = 1 or equals i if di = 0. (From now on we assume 
C, 
that every number we meet is relatively prime with respect to n, hence we can 
t 
compute its inverse.) The attacker can easily compute all the possible °--~ mod n 
ei  
• ' has ¢ possible values in advance (there are a total of t" such values since c i
values). Now the attacker compares all these values with ,-,__2' rood n. Once a 
m 
match is found, he knows i and then knows that di is 1. 
This simple example is just meant to illustrate the basic ideas of our attack. 
It showed that one bit fault at certain location and time can cause fatal leakage 
of the private key. 
The example above assumes that only one ci contains a single bit error and 
that there is no error propagation from ci to cj, j > i. The effects of such 
error propagation were considered in [6] and [9]. As a result, the error models 
in [6] and [9] are more complicated and probably more realistic than ours. From 
practical viewpoint, our model can be explained as the model for "read" error. 
/ when it is multiplied to the va.lue for computing c d That  is, ci is mistaken as c i 
but remains correct when it is squared to obtain ci+l. 
Another issue is that we can actually consider multi-bit fa.ults instead of 
one bit fault only. In this case, we need to compare mJ /m rood ~? with many 
more possible values. For the case of two-bit faults, m~/m rood ~ should be 
I , I  IC matched with all the values Cil(i./ ilCi~ 1Tlod 't~, (il, i'2 C {0, 1, 2 ..... t -  1}) a.nd 
c i-''/ci" 1nod n, where c i'' denotes the value of two bit errors in ci. In this case, 
O(t 4) possible values should be generated in advance and matched (as well as 
those c~/c~ rood n) with the value m'/ f i l  rood 7~. In general, abont t'-'J values 
need to be generated in the situation where j-bit faults may take place. 
2.2  At tack  I I  
Suppose that one bit in the binary representation of d is flipped and that the 
[ault,y bit, position is randomly located. An attacker arbitrarily chooses a plain- 
text m and computes the ciphertext c. He then asks the tamper resistant device 
to decrypt c and induces a random bit error in d by applying external physical 
effects to the device. Assuming that di is changed to its complement d}, then 
the output of the device will be 
d~- i  d ~ d l  d .  rood ~1 IN~ --~ c t - I  " " "c i '  " ' ' c1  CO 
Since the attacker now possesses both m and m/, he can compute 
/ 
--= d rood  7~.. 
FO Ci ' 
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Obviously, if m'/m - 1/ei mod n, then di = 1, and if m'/m = ci rood n, 
then di = 0. Therefore, the attacker can compare m'/m rood n to c~ rood n and 
c~ -1 mod n, for i = 0, 1, . . . , t - l ,  in order to determine one bit ofd'. He repeats the 
above process using either the same plaintext/ciphertext pair or using different 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs until enough information in d is obtained. 
Suppose one bit error takes place randomly in d in each fault test. Then by 
basic probabilistic ounting, we have the tbllowing: If we take t log t fault tests, 
with a probabil ity larger than half, every bit of d is disclosed. 
It should be noted again that this attack applies to the case of multiple bit 
errors. Assuming two bit faults. The attacker needs to compare m//m mod n 
with cicj mod n, ci/c j mod n, and 1/(eicj) mod n, for all i , j  E {0, 1, 2, . . . , t - l} .  
In this cruse, matching m'/m rood n with all these values has a complexity of 
O(t'-) instead of O(t) as in the single error case; while with large possibility one 
obtain two bits, di and dd, once a successflfl match is obtained. 
2.3 Lenst ra ' s  A t tack  on  RSA w i th  Ch inese  Remainder  A lgor i thm 
Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [6] gave an attack on RSA implemented with the 
CRA. Their attack requires two signatures of a given message: one correct sig- 
nature and one faulty signature. Lenstra independently worked out a similar 
attack against RSA with CRA which requires only one faulty signature of a 
known message [9]. In the following, we briefly outline Lenstra's attack. 
The signature s of a message m equals m d mod n and thus s ~ rood n is again 
equal to m rood n. It is well known that s can be computed by computing 
u -- m ~t rood p and v ~ rn d lnod q, 
and by combining u and v using the CRA. If a fault occurs in the course of 
the computat ion of the signature, the resulting value, denoted as s', will most 
likely not satisfy m - s 'e rood n. If, however, the fault occurred only during the 
computat ion of say, u, and if v and the CRA were carried out correctly, then the 
resulting faulty signature s t satisfies s '¢ =_ 'rn rood q, but the same congruence 
rood p does not hold. Therefore, q divides s '¢ - m but p does not divide s '¢ - m, 
so that a factor of n may be discovered by the recipient of the faulty signature 
s' by computing the greatest common divisor of n and s '¢ - m. This attack is 
very powerful since it requires only one faulty signature and it works under a 
general fault model. 
2.4 Some Poss ib le  Countermeasures  
There may be a variety of attacks to PKCs by inducing faults. The means of 
breaking a PKC can be devised to be dependent on the specific PKC algorithm 
as well as on its implementation. Generally speaking, countermeasures to such 
attacks are relatively insensitive to both the implementation of a PKC and the 
attacking scenarios. Here we envisage two general approaches to counter such 
attacks, one is based on the principle of "check and balance" and the other 
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based on the principle of "information hiding". The former can be done by 
checking/verifying the result before sending it to the outside world and the latter 
can be achieved by introducing some randomness in the intermediate stages of 
the cryptographic computation. 
a) The attacks may be avoided by calculating the output 2 times and matching 
the two results. However, this approach doubles the computational time. As 
pointed out in [4], this double computation method also avoids their attack. 
The weakness of this counter measure is that it slows down the computation 
by a factor of 2, which is "not accepted for some applications"[@ 
b) In many cases, the encryption key e is usually small. So we can verify the 
result by checking m '~ = c mod n? It is much more efficient han the double 
computation approach if e is small. This approach was also pointed out 
independently by Lenstra. 
c) In some protocols for digital signature, a random string is chosen by the 
smart card and concatenated to a message rn which is to be signed by the 
smart card. For example, m is a 412 binary string given to the smart card. 
The smart card randomly chooses a 100 bit number r and the output is 
(m]r)  d mod n. Since r is different each time, the attack does not work in 
such  ca, se .  
d) In the case where e is large and where the tamper esistant device is required 
to compute cd rood n, the following efficient method may be used to counter 
the attack. The tamper resistant device generates a random number r and 
computes r d rood n. This can be done in a.dva.nce, i.e., before c is input and 
when the device is idle. To compute c a rood n, the device first computes 
rc mod n, then (rc) a rood 77, and finally ~ mod n. If no fault takes place, 
the output is obviously correct. If any fault takes place, the output is masked 
by r. Since r is unknown to the attacker and different ['or every decryption 
our attack does not work. For the example, in the case of Attack I[, if el, is 
9~ 0 and d} is 1, ther~ m/ /m = r - c.i rood n. Since r is unknown to the attacker, 
the ratio is useless to him. 
It should be pointed out that a) - d) work against, our at, tacks while only a) 
c) work against Lenstra's attack. 
3 Attacking Discrete Logarithm Based Schemes 
The general concept of attacking the RSA scheme can be applied to attack 
against discrete logarithm based public key cryptosystems. In the following, 
we show our attacks to the E1GamM signature scheme, the Sehnorr signature 
scheme, and the DSA. Throughout his section, we will denote a signer's private 
key as x and its binary representation as xt_ l l~et_2 l . . . I . r i l . . . ah lx0 ,  where t is 
the number of bits in x and xi is the ith bit of x. The private key is kept inside a 
tamper esistant device and the corresponding public key can be made a.vailable 
to everyone. 
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The general steps followed by an attacker are as follows: 1) the attacker 
applies external physical effects to induce some bit errors at ra.ndom locations in 
x and then obtains a faulty signature, 2) he performs some computat ions on the 
faulty signature to uncover part of the private key x. The attacker epeats steps 
1) and 2) until he uncovers the binary representation of x or a sufficiently large 
number of bits that allow him to discover the rest of x by brute force. To keep 
the paper compact, we will only show steps 1) and 2) in the following, without 
explicitly showing the loops of the attack. 
To simplify the description, we first show the attacks for the case of single 
bit error. We then briefly discuss the case of multiple bit errors. 
3.1 Attacking the E1Gamal Signature Scheme 
In the E1Gamal signature scheme [7], to generate a private and public key pair, 
we first choose a prime p, a.nd two random numbers, .q and x, such that both g and 
x are less than p. The private key is x and the public key is (y - 9" rood p, g, P)- 
To generate a signature on a message m, the signer first picks a random k 
such that k is relatively prime to p - 1. She then computes 
w~gk modpands= (m-xw) /kmod(p-1)  
The signature is the pair w and s. To verify the signature, the verifier confirms 
that 
yt~, w s =_ g,~ rood p. 
Assume that xi in x is changed to its complement x} during the process of 
signing of a message m. We denote the corrupted x as x' due to the flip of x~. 
Then the outputs of the device will be 
w _= gk mod p and s' =_ (m - x 'w) /k  mod (p - 1) 
Using w, d ,  m, and the signer's public key (y, p, g), the attacker computes 
-- gmflU'(~'-x') mod p. T =_ yWwS' mod p = . 
Let Ri - gWU" mod p for i = 0, 1,2, ...,t - 1. Then, we have 
TR i  =- g'~ rood p, if xi = 0 
(since for xi = 0 we have x - at' = --2 i) and 
T 
=_ g"~ modp,  if xi = 1 
Ri 
(since for xi = 1 we have x - x' = 2i) .  The attacker computes TRi and T/R i  
and tests to see if either TR i  or r /R i  equals gin. mod p, for i = 0, 1 ..... t - 1. If 
a match is found, then one bit of x is found, 
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3.2  At tack ing  the  Schnor r  S ignature  Scheme 
In the Schnorr signature scheme [11], to generate a private and public key pair, 
we first choose two primes, p and q, such that p = zq,+ 1 for a reasonably 
large q. We then select a number g not equal to 1, such that, gq = 1 rood p. 
The signer's private key is a random,  less than q,/and the public key is (g = 
g-~ rood p,g ,p ,q ) .  
To generate a signature on a message m, the signer first picks a random k 
that is less than q. She then computes 
w = gk mod p, e = h(mlw ) and s - ex + k mod q, 
where h is a secure one-way hash function that outputs a number less than q. 
The signature is the pair e and s. Because 
(gSye mod p) = w, 
to verify the signature, the verifier confirms that 
h ( .q (gs¢  rood p)) = 
During the computation of s, assuming that xi in x is flipped to x~ and 
denote the corrupted x as x'. Then the outputs of the device will be 
e ~ h(m]w)  rood p and s f _= ex'  + k mod q 
Using e, s', m, and the signer's public key (y, p, 9, q), the attacker computes 
T = ys'ye = w.qe(.,"-.r) rood t ) 
Let, Hi =- 9 ~,e' mod p for i = 0, 1,2 ..... t -  1. It is easy to see that TRi  =- 
w9 e('r'-'~'+e') rood p and T/R i  = 'w9 e('r '- ' ;-2') ulod p. Then we have 
h(m[(TR i  mod p)) = e, if xl = 1 
(since for xi = 1, we have xl - x = -2  i and then TR i  = w rood p), and 
h(ml (T /R~ mod p)) = e, if xi = 0 
(since for xi = 0, we have x' - x = 2 i and then T/R i  = w rood p). Therefore, 
by iterating through different i and matching e with h(m[(T/ti  rood p)) and 
h( rn l (T /R i  mod p)), the attacker can discover the ith bit, xi, of the private key 
;.F,. 
In [6], Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton gave an attack against he Schnorr identi- 
fication scheme [11]. In their attack, it was required that 1) the verifier uses the 
same challenge e (which plays the same role as the e in the Schnorr signature 
scheme) in all invocations of the identification protocol without being detected 
by the prover's tamper esistant device, and 2) a bit error is introduced in the 
random number k (which plays the same role as the k in the Schnorr signature 
scheme). Because of these two requirements, their attack can not be applied 
to break the Schnorr signature scheme. On the other hand, our attack to the 
Schnorr signature scheme can be applied to breal~ the Schnorr identification 
scheme with little modification. 
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3.3 Attacking the DSA 
In the DSA, to generate a private and public key pair, we first choose a prime 
p such that p = zq + 1 for a reasonably large prime q. We then compute g -= 
b (p-1)/q mod p, where b is any number less than p -1  such that (b O~-~)/q mod p) 
is greater than 1. The signer's private key is x, a random num~ber less than q, 
and the public key is (y - g ~ mod p, g, p, q). 
To sign a message m., the signer first picks a random k that it is less than q. 
She then computes 
w - gk rood p rood q and s - (e + wx) /k  mod q, 
where e = h(m)  with h being a secure one-way hash function that outputs a 
number less than q. The signature is the pair w and s. To verify the signature, 
the verifier confirms that 
to = .q(ue mod q)y(UW mod q) mod p rood q, 
where u - 1Is mod q. 
The attacker applies external physical effects to the tamper resistant device 
and at the same time asks the device to sign a message m. During the process 
of calculating s, we assume that the ith bit of x is changed from xi to its 
complement x}. Let x ~ denote the corrupted x due to the flip of xi.  Then the 
outputs of the device will be 
w =- g ~' mod p mod q and s ~ = (e + wx~) /k  rood q 
[;sing w, "u ~ - 1 Is  ~ mod q, m, and the signer's public key (g, p, 9, q), the attacker 
can compute e = h(m)  and 
T -- g(,,'e mod q)y(~'w mod q) = 9(*,'(e+~cw) rood q) rood p rood q. 
Let Ri = g (~'w~ mod q) mod p mod q for i = 0, 1,2 ..... t - 1. Then we have 
THi  =- g (~'(~+~(x+'')) mod q) mod p rood q 
T/R i  -= 9 (*d(e+w(x-2')) mod q) rood p rood q. 
It is easy to show that 
TRi  - w inod p mod q, if xi = 0 T/R~ =_ w rood p mod q, if xi = 1 
So by iterating through different i and matching w with TRi  rood p rood q and 
T/R i  mod p mod q, the attacker can discover the vMue of xi. 
3.4 Mult iple Bit Errors 
Extension of the above methods in attacking discrete log based digital signature 
schemes to the cases of multiple faults in x is straightforward. In the case 
of single fault, the Rs ,  denoted as Ri in the above single bit error case, each 
has a single argument i. Their computat ion and subsequent comparison is of 
complexity O(2t). In the case of j > 1 faults in x, the Rs,  which we will denote 
as  /~ i l , i2  . . . . .  i j ,  will each have j arguments and their computat ions and subsequent 
comparisons are of complexity O((2t) J ) .  
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3.5 Countermeasures  
The countermeasure achieved through double computation as mentioned in sec- 
tion 2.4 also applies to the attacks presented in this section. 
Another countermeasure to the attack against discrete log based signature 
schemes is that the tamper resistant device stores both x and 1/x ,  where x is 
used in the computation of s and 1/x  is used to check the correctness of s. As 
an example let's consider the Schnorr signature scheme. Right after computing 
s ~ --  ex  ~ + k mod q, the device verifies the value of s ~ by comparing e with 
(s'  - k ) (1 /x )  mod q. If these two values are the same, the result is considered 
correct; otherwise, the device is reset. 
In general, to prevent corrupted variables from being used in a calculation and 
subsequently causing breaking of a cryptosystem, we suggest hat the variable 
and its inverse be stored somewhere before the calculation takes place. The 
variable is used for the calculation and its inverse can be used to verify the 
result of the calculation. 
To illustrate the above concept, let's again consider the Schnorr signature 
scheme. Suppose we want to make sure that the correct values of both x and 
k are used in the calculation of s = ex + k. The tamper resistant device stores 
.r, l /x,  k, 1/k somewhere before the calculation starts. After computing s~ = 
ex'  + k ' ,  the device checks to see if e = t ' ( s ' (1 /k )  - 1)(l/x). The value s' is 
considered correct only if the equality holds. 
4 Conc lud ing  Remarks  
The attack to public-key cryptographic schemes on tamper resistant devk"es 
presented in this paper makes use of transient faults. Our attacking model is 
independent of the implementation f a specific cryptosystem and seems to be 
applicable to breaking large classes of public-key cryptosystems. In particular, 
we showed how to break the RSA, the EIGamal signature scheme, the Schnorr 
signature scheme, and the DSA. 
This attack highlighted that hardware faults can cause fatal leakage of the 
private/secret key values and may eventually lead to breaking of a cryptosystem. 
Therefore, it is important o take fault tolerance into serious consideration i  
the design of cryptosystems and to strike a balance between low overhead and 
high robustness. As a first step, we have proposed some methods to counter our 
attack. It should be noted that there are many other ways of breaking tamper 
resistant devices in addition to the ones outlined in this paper. In general, design 
of fault tolerant tamper esistant devices is a very challenging problem. Readers 
interested in getting more information in this area are refereed to the excellent 
paper by Anderson and Kuhn [1]. 
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